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Abstract:  
Why did the Netherlands become the first country to allow same-sex couples to marry? I 
argue that in addition to social and political factors that have been well-highlighted in the 
literature, the desire of Dutch activists and policy elites to burnish their international 
reputation as a social policy and LGBT rights pioneer played a critical role in motivating the 
government to adopt this controversial policy.  In making this argument, the paper addresses 
the often neglected topic of policy invention. I utilize the concept of regional policy 
community drawn from federalism studies to illustrate that such communities do not just 
facilitate the diffusion of new innovations across its constituent states, but they can also 
inspire pioneering states to experiment with new policy models in the first place.   
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 2 
Introduction 
By 2015, more than thirty countries had implemented policies that recognize same-
sex couples in law and a growing number—seventeen—did so by allowing such couples to 
enter civil marriages (table 1).  European countries, particularly those located in the region’s 
northwest corner, have often been on the vanguard of this policy reform and the expansion of 
lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender (LGBT) rights.  Given the rapid spread of same-sex 
unions (SSU) policies, it is easy to forget how controversial such policies were just two 
decades ago.  This paper seeks to shed light on why certain countries played a pioneering role 
in expanding LGBT rights by examining the processes that led the Netherlands to become the 
first country to open marriage to same-sex couples in 2001.  I argue that in addition to the 
cultural and institutional factors that have been well-highlighted in the literature, the desire of 
Dutch activists and policy elites to burnish their international reputation as a social policy 
pioneer played a critical role in motivating the government to adopt this controversial policy.   
The Dutch same-sex marriage case highlights the often neglected topic of policy 
invention.  Politics scholars have written extensively about how policies diffuse across 
borders and the ways in which governments in one jurisdiction learn from legislation adopted 
in another (Simmons et al 2008).  We know a great deal about how, why and the 
circumstances under which new policies spread across borders, but we know far less about 
why states experiment with new ideas in the first place.  In part this neglect stems from the 
belief that policy invention is separate from diffusion processes and determined by factors 
internal to pioneering states.  Although internal factors are important, there are good reasons 
to suspect that the international context in which states exist also influences their decisions to 
experiment with new policy models.  Much of the international learning literature emphasizes 
the role that the reputation of successful states plays in the decisions of receiving states to 
follow the example of regional leaders (Meseguer 2005).  This literature rarely has turned its 
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lens in the other direction to examine the ways in which the lure of being a policy pioneer, 
and the international reputational gains that come with it, influence national debates and spur 
experimentation in pioneering states. 
The issues of state-to-state policy diffusion and state policy invention have been 
particularly neglected by scholars of European public policy.  Much of this literature has 
focused instead on the ways in which the European Union (EU) influences the policies of its 
member states through legal harmonization.  More recently scholars of LGBT politics have 
addressed the neglected topic of horizontal diffusion across European states by highlighting 
the role that regional policy networks have played in catalysing the expansion of LGBT 
rights, and in particular the spread of SSU policies (Fernandez and Lutter 2013).  This paper 
seeks to add to this literature by illustrating how the existence of a European LGBT policy 
community not only has facilitated the diffusion of SSU policies, but also has encouraged 
pioneering states such as the Netherlands to experiment with new forms of same-sex 
relationship recognition.  I draw on an older US federalism literature, which unlike the 
international policy diffusion discourse examines the role that pioneering states play in the 
initial stages of diffusion processes (Walker 1969).  This literature highlights the ways in 
which policy communities create competition among constituent states for reputational and 
material resources that can spur experimentation with new policy models.  As I illustrate in 
the sections that follow, the Dutch marriage case demonstrates that European policy 
communities not only help member states to learn from their successful neighbours, but they 
also can motivate status-seeking states to experiment with new ideas and to act as teachers of 
new norms.    
 
European Policy Communities, LGBT Rights Expansion and Policy Invention  
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 In 1980, few European states had adopted legislation to combat discrimination against 
LGBT people either as individuals or couples.  Within three decades almost all countries in 
the region had decriminalized same-sex sexual activity, implemented legislation to combat 
sexual orientation discrimination in the workplace and, starting with Denmark in 1989, a 
majority had adopted SSU legislation (Carroll and Itaborahy 2015).  Increasingly, scholars 
have argued that this rapid expansion of LGBT rights is due not merely to simultaneous 
socio-political change, but to a significant degree has been catalysed by a European policy 
community.  Although the EU and the European Court of Human Rights have brought about 
some of this reform through the imposition of legal mandates, recent scholarship has 
emphasized how informal policy networks have promoted the expansion of LGBT rights via 
horizontal, state-to-state policy diffusion (Kollman 2013).  These informal processes have 
been particularly influential in the area of relationship recognition, where until very recently 
both the EU and the European Court of Human Rights have shied away from issuing far-
reaching legal directives.1    
These scholars draw on constructivist theories of social learning to show how LGBT 
rights policies spread across borders.  Social learning occurs when engagement with new 
normative arguments and examples of proper behaviour lead political actors to change how 
they define their interests (Ruggie 1998).  Philip Ayoub has shown that European states are 
more likely to implement LGBT rights legislation when their national movements have 
strong ties to European networks.  Well-networked national activists utilize examples of 
pioneering countries to add legitimacy to their own campaigns for greater rights.  These 
connections are particularly powerful in the new EU member states where LGBT rights 
remain more controversial than in Western Europe (Ayoub 2015).  Juan Fernandez and Mark 
Lutter (2013) similarly argue that the wave of SSU policy adoptions in Europe since the 
1990s has been influenced by cross-border learning.  Countries that have greater links to 
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transnational NGOs and intergovernmental organizations are more likely to adopt an SSU 
policy than countries where these linkages are weaker.  David Paternotte and Kelly Kollman 
(2013) have illustrated how a European network of LGBT activists and supportive 
policymakers helped SSU campaigners in West European countries to craft strategies to get 
the issue onto their country’s political agenda and to legitimately frame it as a human right.  
These authors show how important the demonstration effect of early adopters can be in 
regional policy communities.  
Very little of this literature, however, has examined why certain European countries 
consistently have been the first to experiment with new LGBT rights policies.  Scholars 
largely have assumed that policy invention—the implementation of policy models that 
previously have not been implemented elsewhere—can be explained by a limited set of 
domestic factors.  Older work on LGBT movements emphasized the role of institutional 
opportunity structures such as party and parliamentary systems to explain the early and 
differential policy successes of national movements (Adam et al 1999).  Morality politics 
scholars have examined how the nature of LGBT rights policies interacts with these domestic 
factors.  These scholars define morality politics as issues such as LGBT rights that are highly 
salient to the public, technically simple and framed as issues over first principles (Heichel et 
al 2013).  As a result, the political processes that accompany LGBT rights expansion are 
influenced by public opinion, religious values and party competition to a greater extent than 
other policy types (Mooney and Lee 2001).  European scholars have posited that this kind of 
morality politics can affect the agenda-setting processes of European countries where religion 
has been incorporated into the party system as a central cleavage as happened, for example, 
in the Benelux countries, but not in Scandinavia (Engeli et al 2012).  More recently, 
Christoph Knill has combined the institutional opportunity and morality politics approaches 
to explain why LGBT rights reform has occurred in certain European countries more quickly 
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than others after the issue has come onto the agenda.  He and his co-authors illustrate how 
governing coalitions and institutional veto points shape these policy outputs (Knill and 
Preidel 2015).   
Although clearly useful, these literatures largely ignore the international aspects of 
debates about LGBT rights expansion (Heichel et al 2013: 329-30).  The same-sex marriage 
issue, however, has demonstrated that morality issues are also compelling to international 
audiences.  There are thus good reasons to suspect that pioneering states’ experimentation 
with novel LGBT rights would be influenced by the international context in which they exist 
in addition to domestic factors.  This paper seeks to add to the LGBT and morality politics 
literatures by examining how institutional and cultural factors interact with the influence of 
the regional policy community to explain the under-explored issue of policy invention.   
 To do so, I draw on literature that examines policy innovation within federal systems.  
Numerous studies have illustrated the ways in which federal and quasi-federal systems act as 
laboratories for policy experimentation among these systems’ constituent members (Kerber 
and Eckardt 2007).  Much of this literature has been developed by US politics scholars, 
largely beginning with Jack Walker’s seminal article.  Walker’s (1969: 880-81) enquiry 
sought to address two questions: Why do some (US) states adopt policy innovations more 
readily than others? 2  How do new policies diffuse across states after innovation has 
occurred?  Walker’s and the literature’s interest in the first question—the subject of this 
paper—was based on the notion that policy innovation and diffusion frequently are related 
processes. Walker demonstrated that the spread of new policies often is driven by a leader-
laggard dynamic in which certain US states consistently serve as early adopters or pioneers of 
new models.  These policies are then taken up by other states in the region that take cues 
from well-known pioneers.3   
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Walker (1969), like many scholars, notes that richer and more urban US states tend to 
adopt new programmes more quickly than their more rural and poorer counterparts.  This 
finding highlights the resources necessary for policy experimentation, but gives little insight 
into the motivation for doing so.  Here scholars have speculated that a state’s place in a 
broader policy community can serve as a motive to implement new policy.  Laboratory 
federalism scholars argue that states in federal systems have an incentive to invent and 
implement new policies that will attract firms and/or citizens to their jurisdictions (Kerber 
and Eckardt 2007).  These governments also have an incentive to build a reputation for policy 
innovation within the system.  Martina Kerber and Wolfgang Eckardt (2007) have argued that 
although rarely explored by European public policy scholars, these dynamics also should 
apply to EU member states.  
While much of the laboratory federalism literature focuses on the material incentives 
for policy innovation, others have argued that states can seek to build such a reputation for its 
own sake.  Being perceived as a pioneer within a policy community that others seek to 
emulate is often a reward in itself.  Walker (1969: 881) notes that Wisconsin frequently is 
keen to reinforce the reputation that it gained during the Progressive Era as a policy pioneer.  
Donald Haider-Markel and Ken Meier (2003) show how LGBT activists in Wisconsin used 
this reputation to persuade state policymakers to adopt the country’s first anti-discrimination 
law that includes sexual preference.  The desire to sustain a reputation for policy 
inventiveness within a regional system—with all the material and reputational advantages it 
engenders—can serve as a motive for future policy invention.  I use these insights to illustrate 
how the prospect of becoming a high-profile LGBT rights pioneer, and a teacher of a new 
norm, influenced the marriage debate in the Netherlands and played a critical role in 
persuading the government to become the first country to do so.  
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Methods 
 I use the single case study of the opening of marriage in the Netherlands as a 
plausibility probe to evaluate the utility of laboratory federalism and leader-laggard models of 
diffusion for explaining policy invention in Europe.  It is a useful case in which to do so.  
Same-sex marriage represents a high-profile, morality politics issue in which the reputational 
stakes are considerable because of the issue’s prominence.  This was reinforced in the Dutch 
case by several factors.  First, LGBT rights were high on the European agenda by the mid-
1990s with the incorporation of sexual orientation into the EU treaties and the expansion of 
such rights in Northern European countries.  Second, the Netherlands had established itself as 
an LGBT rights pioneer.  It was one of the first countries to implement anti-discrimination 
measures in the early1990s and was the fifth country to adopt a registered partnership (RP) 
law.  Finally, the Dutch marriage law is a case of policy (re)-invention.  The Netherlands 
made a significant change to the RP model, which was first implemented in Denmark and 
then emulated by other countries.  The move from RPs to marriage, however, was no small 
tweak.  It was an important victory for LGBT rights movements, most of which favour it to 
RPs because it signifies full equality and comes with significant symbolic benefits.   Same-
sex marriage invention thus represents a case where the reputational stakes within the 
regional policy community for a country like the Netherlands were high, but far from certain.   
As such, it is a ‘most likely’ case for international reputational effects.  As proponents 
of case study methods advise, most likely cases can serve as an effective plausibility probe to 
evaluate how well a theory explains a poorly understood phenomenon, in this case policy 
invention (George and Bennett 2005: 75).  I seek to add credibility to my argument by 
examining the influence of the international reputation variable and its alternatives 
(government composition, movement support, tolerance of homosexuality and religiosity) 
within the case over time.  Like all single case studies used to develop new—or adapted—
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theory, more research is needed to assess the robustness of my findings and theoretical 
claims.  
The case study findings are based on two sources of evidence: (1) translated 
documents of contemporary court decisions, parliamentary debates and legislative texts (2) 
semi-structured interviews with fifteen LGBT activists, government officials and 
policymakers, who took part in the marriage debate and represent views from both sides of 
the issue.   
 
Pioneering Marriage for Same-sex Couples   
Like most LGBT rights activists in western countries, Dutch SSU advocates favoured 
the opening of marriage to RPs.  Unlike in the Nordic countries that pioneered RP laws, 
however, Dutch SSU activists refused to compromise and remained critical of RPs 
throughout the campaign.  This focus on marriage partially stemmed from the fact that the 
main national LGBT organization, the Centre for Culture and Leisure (COC), had little 
interest in focusing on relationship recognition (Interview LGBT Activist 8/5/2009).  Many 
within the organization preferred more radical reform such as de-regulating family policy and 
largely opted out of the campaign.  This allowed an unusual coalition of legal activists and a 
crusading publisher of an LGBT magazine, Henk Krol, to argue that only opening marriage 
represents true equality for same-sex couples (Van Velde 2009).   
Krol and several prominent lawyers helped launch court cases in the late 1980s that 
challenged the exclusion of same-sex couples from Dutch marriage law.  These legal 
challenges ended with the Hoge Raad (Supreme Court) ruling in 1990 that confirmed only 
different-sex couples had a right to marry.  In its ruling the Court did hint, however, that 
withholding the benefits associated with civil marriage might be discriminatory and put the 
government under pressure to address the issue (Maxwell 2000).  The campaign for 
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relationship recognition gained momentum in 1994 when a new government, which for the 
first time in the post-war era did not include the Christian Democratic Appeal (CDA), entered 
office.  This so-called purple coalition made up of the Labour Party (PvdA), the Liberals 
(VVD), and the left-libertarians (D’66), however, remained reluctant to go beyond the 
implementation of an RP scheme.  When the RP law came into force in 1998, it was 
dismissed by many activists as discriminatory (Van Velde 2009).   
The marriage campaign was given further impetus in 1997, after the RP law had been 
adopted but before it came into force, with the publication of the Kortmann Commission’s 
recommendations.  The Commission, which was composed of legal experts, had been 
established by the government to examine the legal implications of allowing same-sex 
couples to marry (Curry-Sumner 2007).  The government created this commission after a 
backbench parliamentary resolution was passed in 1996 calling on the government to open 
marriage rather than implement an RP, a move that was supported by a majority of the public 
at the time (Curry-Sumner 2007).  The Commission gave the government breathing room to 
delay a reform that many report the government did not want (Van Velde 2009; Interview 
Justice Ministry Official 11/9/2009).  When the Commission published its findings a majority 
on the panel urged the government to open marriage.  After winning re-election in 1998, the 
purple coalition government agreed to implement its recommendations and on April 1, 2001 
the world’s first state-sanctioned marriage between two people of the same sex took place 
(Maxwell 2000).  
 
The Invention of Same-sex Marriage in the Netherlands: The Insufficiency of Cultural and 
Institutional Factors  
Why was the Netherlands the first country to pioneer this reform?  Initially, it would 
seem that the institutional and cultural factors highlighted in the morality and LGBT politics 
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literatures offer an adequate explanation.  The Netherlands has a well-established LGBT 
movement and one of the world’s oldest lesbian and gay organizations, the Centre for Culture 
and Leisure.  The COC spearheaded legal reforms throughout the 1970s and 1980s that left 
marriage supporters with a favourable policy legacy (Schuyf and Krouwel 1999).  Further, 
since the 1980s international surveys have established that the Dutch public is comparatively 
tolerant of homosexuality and has moderate levels of religiosity (EVS 2011).  Finally, the 
campaign for opening marriage coincided with the election of the first purple coalition 
government in post-war history, which forced the Christian democratic, CDA party into 
opposition.  As some morality politics scholars argue, the secular parties of the purple 
coalition not only were more likely to favour opening marriage, they also had an incentive to 
put the issue on the agenda to win political points over the CDA (Engeli et al 2012).   
The effects of these oft-cited factors on the Dutch debate, however, are not as decisive 
as they appear.  First, the COC largely was uninvolved in the campaign and opening marriage 
was a low priority for many in the movement.  Second, although the Dutch public in the 
1990s was comparatively tolerant of homosexuality, levels of religiosity as measured by 
church attendance were still much higher than in Scandinavia (EVS 2011).  Further, levels of 
religiosity and tolerance of homosexuality did not change dramatically over the decade 
during which the marriage debate occurred; it seems unlikely that these small changes alone, 
helped convince initially reluctant political elites to open marriage.4     
Finally, the election of the purple coalition government may have been necessary for 
the opening of marriage, but it was far from sufficient.  Historically left governments in 
Europe have not been enough to trigger the implementation of SSU policies.  There were 
numerous centre-left governments in Western Europe in the post-war era and none adopted 
an SSU law until 1989; not one opened marriage until the Dutch did so in 2001.  Although 
the purple coalition was the first Dutch government in post-war history in which the Christian 
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democrats did not participate, marriage did not automatically follow from its election.  It took 
marriage activists and supportive backbench MPs more than six years to persuade a hesitant 
purple coalition government to support the reform and they did so only after they were 
elected into government for the second time.  There is almost no evidence to suggest that the 
secular parties in this government sought to make same-sex marriage a central part of their 
governing agenda, nor did they use it for electoral gain. 
The contention that these domestic factors were necessary, but not decisive for the 
Dutch decision is reinforced by examining the other marriage pioneers—Belgium, Canada, 
Spain and South Africa—that immediately followed in the Netherlands’ wake.  When 
compared to other established democracies, none of these countries had particularly high 
levels of tolerance towards homosexuality or particularly low levels of religiosity.  Like the 
Netherlands, all four had or were seeking to establish an international reputation as a 
normative ‘middle power’ (Brysk 2009; Friedman 2012).5  Canada and South Africa in 
particular had built international reputations as human rights leaders with the adoption of a 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms in the 1980s in the former and the overthrow of the 
Apartheid regime in the 1990s in the latter (Brysk 2009).  Both countries incorporated sexual 
orientation protections into their constitutions early and reaped international reputational 
rewards for doing so.  In both cases scholars have noted that ‘international opportunity 
structures’ played a role in the campaigns for opening marriage (Croucher 2011: 160; 
Kollman 2013).  
As outlined below, it is striking how prominent concerns about international 
reputation were in the campaign for same-sex marriage in the Netherlands.  Dutch marriage 
proponents used the growing example of SSU laws in other European countries to persuade 
policy elites they should address the issue of relationship recognition (Van Velde 2009).  The 
use of these examples did not stop after the Netherlands implemented an RP law.  Rather 
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such examples became an important part of marriage proponents’ argument that the 
Netherlands should play a leadership role by opening marriage.  It was this rapidly changing 
international environment—an environment that changed more dramatically during the 1990s 
than domestic levels of tolerance or religiosity—that Dutch marriage supporters used to 
convince an initially sceptical government that they should be the first country to allow same-
sex couples to marry.  
 
Locating the Dutch Marriage Debate within its International Context: The Lure of Being a 
Policy Pioneer  
By the time the Dutch government began to consider same-sex relationship recognition, 
policy networks dedicated to lesbian and gay rights had already been established within the 
European polity.  In 1996 this activism was institutionalized with the creation of the 
International Lesbian, Gay, Sexual, Trans and Intersex Association’s European branch 
(ILGA-Europe).  This organization has become the hub of a well-organized policy 
community that is made up of national LGBT organizations, activist lawyers and sympathetic 
policymakers (Paternotte and Kollman 2013).  The policy community has secured notable 
victories within the European human rights regime.  In 1981, the European Court of Human 
Rights ruled that national laws that criminalize same-sex sexual behaviour violate the 
European Convention on Human Rights (Dugeon v United Kingdom 1981).  Later rulings 
established that European states should have equal ages of consent for same and different-sex 
sexual activity (Sutherland v UK 1996) and should allow gay men and lesbians to serve 
openly in national militaries (Lustig-Prean and Beckett v UK 1999).  In 1997, the EU 
incorporated sexual orientation into the Amsterdam Treaty’s anti-discrimination clause and 
then implemented legislation that outlawed such discrimination, albeit only in the workplace 
(Carroll and Itaborahy 2015).  By the start of new millennium, the EU and several of its 
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member states had begun to define themselves as global LGBT rights pioneers.  The 
Netherlands, whose activists have played a leadership role in building the policy community 
and whose government has pioneered sexual orientation anti-discrimination legislation, 
embraced this identity early (Rupp 2014).   
Relationship recognition came onto the European agenda in 1989 when Denmark 
became the first country to implement an SSU policy in the form of an RP law, which granted 
couples many, although not all, of the rights and duties of civil marriage6.  The RP model 
first was proposed in Sweden in the 1970s by reformers who wanted to introduce a less 
formal institution to legally recognize different-sex couples uninterested in marriage as well 
as same-sex couples (Rydstroem 2008).  The Danish law kept the RP model, but limited it to 
same-sex couples.  The fact that Denmark borrowed the model from Sweden illustrates how 
the issue has been shaped by cross-border learning from the beginning.   
As this paper demonstrates, countries tend to emphasize their role as teachers in these 
processes. Denmark was no exception.  Before the law was adopted its supporters argued that 
Denmark could serve as an international model and increase tolerance of homosexuality in 
other societies by legally recognizing same-sex couples (Bech 1992).  This prediction came 
good in the Nordic region when Denmark’s neighbours followed their lead by implementing 
similar RP laws in the 1990s.  Some activists, however, criticized these RP policies as 
discriminatory and argued that separate and unequal institutions define same-sex couples as 
second class citizens (see Halvorsen 1998).  Dutch SSU campaigners embraced this 
argument.  By this time, the European LGBT policy community was more established and the 
potential for reputational gains for LGBT pioneers more tangible then when the Danes 
adopted their RP law.  This rapidly changing European environment was used to great effect 
by Dutch marriage activists.  
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The Dutch marriage debate largely focused on the equality arguments of the marriage 
supporters and the counter arguments by opponents about the traditional meaning of marriage 
and its purpose as a site of procreation.  From the beginning Dutch SSU activists clearly 
distinguished between the ability of marriage and RPs to bring same-sex couples full 
equality.  This argument led to the incorporation of foreign comparisons into the debate.  
Indeed during the parliamentary hearings in 1995-96 that resulted in a backbench resolution 
calling on the government to open marriage to same-sex couples, the issue of the 
‘international context’ was raised extensively by MPs on both sides.  MPs from the Christian 
democratic parties argued that by fundamentally re-defining the institution, the government 
ran the risk of diminishing Dutch marriages in foreign countries.  The deputy Justice 
Minister, Elizabeth Schmitz (PvdA), picked up on this argument.  She used the example of 
the Defense of Marriage acts in the US, which were adopted by many states and the federal 
government following a positive same-sex marriage ruling in Hawaii in 1994, to highlight 
what can happen when one jurisdiction redefines marriage in ways not recognized by 
neighbouring jurisdictions (Kammerstukken 22 700 no.16 1995/1996).  The international 
context also figured prominently in the deliberations of the Kortmann Commission, which the 
government formed to examine the legal implications of opening marriage.  The 
Commission’s minority, who recommended against opening marriage, highlighted the 
potential negative international consequences; these included a lack of recognition for Dutch 
couples who travelled abroad and potential problems with international adoptions (Maxwell 
2000).   
Marriage advocates responded by drawing on the Netherlands’ reputation for social 
policy innovation to support their contention that the Dutch government should be the first to 
open marriage.  This argument is reflected in the following statement by an MP from the 
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Green-Left party in the parliamentary debate to highlight the inadequacy of the proposed RP 
law. 
 
My [party] is therefore in favour of going further and positively putting the possibility 
of the opening of marriage on the table…I come to the point of the relationship 
between the Netherlands, Denmark, Sweden and Norway.  These are probably the 
only countries in Europe that [will make] this step on relationships.  For the rest the 
Netherlands will probably, like in the field of drugs, remain isolated within Europe 
(Kammerstukken 22 700 no.16 1995/1996; translated by Dorien Keizer).   
 
Although this MP thought the Dutch could only influence a few like-minded countries, other 
marriage proponents were more optimistic about the possibility of Dutch leadership.  Mieke 
van der Burg (PvdA), a leading backbench proponent of same-sex marriage, argued that 
“[w]hat the cabinet says on stepping out of pace internationally is correct, but what is wrong 
with that?” (Kammerstukken 22 700 no.16 1995/1996; translated by Dorien Keizer).  Van der 
Burg went on to argue that the situation was different in Europe than in the US and that the 
Netherlands could serve as a model for other countries in the region by being the first to 
allow same-sex couples to marry.  The majority of the influential Kortmann Commission that 
recommended opening marriage similarly augmented their legal arguments about equal 
treatment with the observation that the Netherlands could serve as an international model.  In 
the conclusion to their report they noted the following.  
 
[S]ame-sex marriages represent a step towards recognizing homosexual relationships, 
and might in fact inspire other countries to extend proper recognition to homosexual 
couples.  (Kortmann Commission quoted in Maxwell 2000).   
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The desire to compete with other ‘progressive’ European countries and the ambition to be a 
leader among them comes through in the testimony of these marriage supporters as leader-
laggard and laboratory federalism arguments posit. 
To better gauge the role that the international context played in the marriage debate, I 
interviewed 15 activists and policymakers that took part in it.  When asked why the 
Netherlands was the first to open marriage, most interviewees mentioned that the election of 
the purple coalition government and high levels of tolerance towards homosexuality were 
important facilitating factors.  Most also noted, however, that the government would have 
preferred to adopt an RP and had to be persuaded to open marriage. These activists and elites 
had different views about how and the extent to which the international context shaped the 
marriage debate and its outcomes.  But both proponents and opponents agreed that the 
potential international ramifications of being the first country to allow same-sex couples to 
marry played an important role in the deliberations.   
Several marriage activists felt that the international context had hindered their 
campaign as much as aided it.  Opponents of the reform had argued that the Dutch were in 
danger ‘of getting too far out ahead of events” and the international community (Interviews 
LGBT Activist 5/5/2009; PvdA Official 7/5/2009).  One activist noted that in making such 
arguments supporters of traditional marriage were trying to tap into the feeling of many 
Dutch who disliked the country’s reputation for permissive social policy (Interview Dutch 
LGBT Activist 5/5/2009).  But another policymaker, who was in a senior government 
position in the early part of the debate, indicated that they thought the international context 
had aided the marriage campaign.  They noted that at some point same-sex relationship 
recognition, which once had been thought of as a socially conservative reform, ‘became a 
signal of progressivity’ in Europe (Interview PvdA Official, 8/5/2009).   
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Several of the activists and policy elites also noted that Dutch LGBT activists and 
policymakers have tended to view the Netherlands as an ‘exporter’ of LGBT rights that sets 
rather than follows international trends (Interviews PvdA Official 5/5/2009; LGBT Activists 
8/5/2009; 8/5/2009).  As one interviewee recalled, many SSU activists ‘wanted to influence 
the whole world’ with the Dutch example and saw themselves as ‘missionaries’ (Interview 
Legal Scholar 7/9/2009).  Whether seen positively or with scepticism, it seems clear that 
within the European LGBT policy community, the Dutch are more likely to see themselves as 
teachers than learners.  Taken together the interviewees felt that the international context had 
a clear but complex influence on the marriage debate.  Some, however, were less circumspect 
about its effects.  When asked why the Netherlands was the first country to open marriage to 
same-sex couples, a CDA official who entered parliament just after the law’s adoption, had 
this to say about the role of the international context.    
 
The main view in this country was we want to be modern, we want to be progressive 
and we will lead the world…We wanted to be the first (Interview CDA Official 
8/9/2009).  
 
The importance of the international context is also illustrated by the fact that in its 
introduction to the act that opened marriage, the government signalled its desire to serve as an 
international example when justifying its reasoning for the reform.  While acknowledging 
that Dutch marriages between same-sex couples likely would not be recognized outside the 
country, the government noted the Kortmann Commission’s finding that “this fact might put 
extra pressure on the other countries to end the phenomenon of limping [uneven] legal 
relations” (Staatsblad 2001, no.9; translated by Dorien Keizer).   
 
Playing the Policy Entrepreneur: Burnishing a Reputation as a LGBT Rights Pioneer 
 The ways in which Dutch activists and policymakers have engaged with the 
European—and broader international—LGBT policy community since the opening of 
marriage illustrate the importance of the country’s pioneering reputation to these actors and 
reinforces the view that augmenting this reputation served as an important motivation for 
becoming the first country to do so.  Kees Waaldijk, a member of the Kortmann Commission, 
for example, has helped build an influential network of legal advocates that has aided 
national SSU activists in crafting legal arguments for marriage cases (Paternotte 2011).  
Through such publications as ‘Others may follow: the introduction of marriage, quasi-
marriage, and semi-marriage for same-sex couples in European countries’, Waaldijk has 
drawn on the Dutch experience to promote same-sex relationship recognition in other 
countries (Waaldijk 2004).  Indeed this document was submitted as an affidavit to the 
Canadian Supreme Court when it was considering a reference on opening marriage to same-
sex couples.  Henk Krol similarly has sought to burnish the Netherlands’ reputation as a 
marriage pioneer by using the Dutch example to foster change in other countries. In a 
pamphlet published by his organization, he noted the following.   
 
Some countries will recognize the Dutch marriage, others will wait.  In those cases, 
couples can challenge discriminatory laws and force new rights by going to court. The 
more couples do so, the quicker the rest of the world will follow the Dutch example of 
recognizing equality (quoted in Van Velde 2009: xx). 
 
Since 2001, the Dutch government also has sought to promote its image as an LGBT 
pioneer by making the promotion of LGBT rights and same-sex relationship recognition a 
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key foreign policy goal.  The government’s LGBT Equality Policy Plan adopted in 2011 
describes the motivations for such international efforts in the following way.   
 
[By] 2015 the Netherlands will be at the global vanguard in terms of the social 
acceptance and protection of the rights of LGBT people…[T]he Netherlands serves as 
an example within and outside Europe, working actively in support of equal rights and 
treatment as well as mutual recognition of registered civil partnerships and same-sex 
marriages…As the first country to legalise same sex marriage, the Netherlands plays 
an important initiating role in the world (Ministry of Education, Culture and Science 
2011: 5; 26).  
 
 The policy plan earmarks resources for Dutch embassies to utilize to “provide moral and 
financial support to local LGBT organizations…” (Ministry of Education, Culture and 
Science 2011: 26).  In Europe, Dutch policymakers have taken a leadership role in trying to 
establish a mutual recognition system for same-sex spouses across states in the region.  In 
addition, they have helped to create networks of European policymakers that meet 
periodically to exchange ‘good practice’ on LGBT issues (Baks 2011).   
LGBT activists and policymakers across the political spectrum have embraced the 
country’s status as an LGBT rights pioneer.  Indeed this reputation has been utilized by far-
right politicians such as Geert Wilders, who use the country’s status as an LGBT rights leader 
to argue for the moral superiority of Europeans over ‘less tolerant’ cultures and religions, 
especially Islam.  Several observers have noted that tolerance towards homosexuality has 
become embedded in notions of Dutch national identity.  This so-called ‘homo-
nationalism’—both its more benign and right-wing populist variants—draws on a century-
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long tradition of recognizing minority groups and puts pride of place on the tolerance of 
homosexuality (Mepschen et al 2010).   
The embrace of LGBT rights by the Dutch public and political elites illustrates the 
extent to which this identity is defined in relation to its European neighbours in much the 
same manner as Walker argues policy pioneers do in the US system.  It seems unlikely that 
the issue of opening marriage to same-sex couples would have come onto the Dutch political 
agenda when it did or that supporters of the reform would have been able to convince the 
government to adopt the reform as early as they did without the existence of the European 
policy community.  It served as a stimulus for getting the issue onto the political agenda in 
the early 1990s.  It then served as a reservoir of potential reputational gains that marriage 
proponents used to convince a reluctant government of the merits of being the first country to 
take this controversial step.     
 
Conclusions 
As LGBT politics scholars have noted, European policy networks have helped to 
facilitate the expansion of LGBT rights and the diffusion of SSU policies across the region 
(Fernandez and Lutter 2013; Paternotte and Kollman 2013).  But very little of this literature 
has examined why certain European countries consistently have pioneered this rights 
expansion.  As this paper has illustrated, policy invention by these pioneer states is part of a 
related process.  The formation of a European LGBT policy community in the early 1990s 
helped to inspire the Netherlands to become the first country to open marriage by creating a 
potential audience to recognize its leadership as well as reasonable expectations of 
reputational gains.   
The desire to be first was not the only reason the Dutch decided to open marriage.  
The insights provided by the LGBT and morality politics literatures are also relevant for 
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explaining this outcome.  Several of the cultural and institutional factors highlighted in these 
accounts are necessary for explaining the Dutch outcome, but none is sufficient.  It took 
marriage campaigners almost seven years to persuade the centre-left government that opening 
marriage to same-sex couples was the right thing to do despite the high levels of tolerance for 
homosexuality and significant public support for the reform that existed when it entered 
office.  As the nature of the policy discourse that unfolded in the Netherlands illustrates, an 
important part of what persuaded the government to take this controversial step was the 
expectation that their decision on this increasingly prominent issue would be recognized by 
an international audience and would add to their reputation for social policy innovation.  
Cross-border policy communities do not just create learners; they also create self-appointed 
teachers and a desire to be seen as a policy pioneer.   
The Dutch marriage case highlights the potential of applying the lessons of laboratory 
federalism and leader-laggard models of policy invention to the European polity.  The case 
presented in this paper is an illustrative one that draws on a ‘most likely’ case to illuminate 
the potential that these literatures hold for explaining policy invention in Europe, a largely 
neglected topic among policy scholars.  Further research is needed to flesh out the extent, 
mechanisms and conditions under which the European polity spurs policy innovation within 
the region’s constituent states.   
The Dutch marriage case highlights two additional lines of future research. First, the 
findings have implications for the study of morality politics.  Specifically, they illustrate that 
the unique characteristics of morality politics issues, such as high public salience and 
arguments over first principles, do not just affect how policymakers and activists seek to play 
to domestic audiences.  Crucially, they also affect how these key political actors play to 
international audiences.  In the Dutch case, there is far more evidence to suggest that same-
sex marriage proponents in the secular parties were interested in influencing future European 
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debates about relationship recognition than in gaining an advantage over the Christian 
democratic parties as morality politics accounts posit.  The global expansion of LGBT rights 
and the spread of same-sex marriage have highlighted how important the international aspects 
of these debates over first principles can be.   
Finally, the Dutch marriage case implies that policy diffusion scholars should pay 
more attention to the role that pioneering states play as teachers of new norms and policy 
models within regional policy communities and international society.  The diffusion literature 
largely has focused on the role that international organizations and advocacy networks play in 
the spread of new policy ideas.  States generally are thought of as lesson-drawers in these 
accounts.  Very little research has examined the ways in which state pioneers promote their 
inventions to other states or within advocacy networks.  While it does not necessarily follow 
that policy pioneers automatically will strive to be active international teachers, the Dutch 
case makes clear that some pioneers will seek to do exactly that.  It goes beyond the scope of 
this paper to trace the influence that the Dutch government has had on the spread of same-sex 
marriage laws since 2001.  But their efforts highlight the fact the state teachers may be under-
appreciated as promoters of new policy ideas within diffusion research, with the corollary 
that we may be over-estimating the influence of NGOs and intergovernmental organizations, 
even supra-national ones such as the EU.   
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Table 1: National Same-sex Unions Legislation since 1989 
 
Marriage   Registered    Unregistered    
    Partnership   Partnership   
 
Netherlands (2001)  Denmark (1989-2012) Israel (1994) 
Belgium (2003)  Norway (1993-2009)  Hungary (1996) 
Canada (2005)  Sweden (1995-2009)  Canada (2000) 
Spain (2005)   Iceland (1996-2010)  Portugal (2001) 
South Africa (2006)  Netherlands (1998)  Austria (2003) 
Norway (2009)  France (1999)   Croatia (2003) 
Sweden (2009)  Belgium (2000)  Australia (2008) 
Portugal (2010)  Germany (2001)  Brazil (2011)  
Iceland (2010)   Finland (2002)  Estonia (2016)** 
Argentine (2010)  Luxembourg (2004) 
Denmark (2012)  United Kingdom (2005) 
France (2013)   Andorra (200%) 
New Zealand (2013)  Switzerland (2005) 
Uruguay (2013)  New Zealand (2005) 
United Kingdom (2014)* Czech Republic (2006) 
Luxembourg (2015)  Slovenia (2006) 
United States (2015)  Colombia (2007) 
Finland (2017)**  Uruguay (2008) 
    Ecuador (2009) 
    Hungary (2009) 
Austria (2010)  
Ireland (2010)*** 
Liechtenstein (2011) 
Malta (2014) 
Chile (2015) 
    Greece (2015) 
Source: Carroll and Itaborahy, 2015.   
* Northern Ireland does not allow same-sex couples to marry.  
**SSU policy has been adopted, but doesn’t come into force until indicated in parentheses.  
***Ireland held a referendum in May 2015 in which a majority supported opening marriage 
to same-sex couples.  The government has to pass legislation to translate this decision into 
law.  
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1 On July 20, 2015 the European Court of Human Rights in the Oliara and Others v Italy case condemned Italy 
for failing to recognize same-sex couples in law.  
2 US federalism scholars distinguish between policy innovation and invention.  The former occurs when a state 
adopts a policy that is new to it and the latter occurs when a state adopts a policy that is new to the system.  This 
paper focuses on invention. The factors that influence the early adoption of policy should also influence states’ 
propensity to invent.   
3This dynamic can be driven by rational or social learning.  Pioneers may produce empirical evidence about 
policies that successfully address common problems (rational learning) or they may set an example of how 
successful states should act (social learning) (Berry and Berry 2014).  
4 The percentage of people that agreed homosexuality ‘is never justified’ went from 13% in 1990 to 7% in 1999 
(EVS 2011).   
5 The Nordic countries also have reputations as normative middle powers. Because Nordic LGBT activists had 
campaigned for RPs in the 1990s, it was difficult for them to argue for the necessity of marriage until it became 
an international norm.    
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6 'The Netherlands and Sweden extended limited legal recognition to same-sex cohabitants in 
certain legislation before 1989.  This recognition was piecemeal and most scholars do not 
consider such measures to be fully-fledged SSU laws. 
